I. INTRODUCTION After visiting a non-network urologist, a Virginia woman's insurer sent her a check to cover a portion of the expenses incurred. Around the same time she received the check, her son's college tuition also came due. The woman used the money from her health insurance check to pay the university. She still owed her urologist, however, and when the urologist tried to collect from her sometime later, he was unable to do so because she had declared bankruptcy. 1 This story is not unique. In fact, some doctors say it occurs often enough that it threatens their ability to provide health care services. 2 A potential solution is to require insurance companies to honor an individual's wish to send payments directly to her provider, even if the provider is not in the insurer's network. In other words, an individual should have the power to assign her benefits to an out-of-network provider.
Some states have passed mandatory assignment of benefits ("AOB") legislation. 3 A mandatory AOB law requires insurers to send payments directly to out-of-network providers who have executed an AOB agreement with the covered individual. Proponents of mandatory AOB legislation suggest there are other important advantages to AOB beyond making it eas- ier for health care providers to collect payments. 4 However, critics contend that mandatory AOB would have negative effects on the health care system. 5 Section II of this note presents background information on the history of the AOB issue. Section m examines the arguments in favor of mandatory AOB legislation, and Section IV explores the arguments against mandatory AOB. Finally, Section V explains why the arguments in favor of mandatory AOB prevail and how Indiana should structure mandatory AOB legislation.
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE PLANS AND AOB
A briefhistory of the development of the health care industry provides a helpful basis on which to analyze the AOB issue. The most basic reason for the existence of health insurance plans is that people want to share the risk of financial loss due to illness or injury. 6 A health insurance plan generally includes four parties: consumers, providers, sponsors, and intermediaries. ' Consumers, often referred to as ''insureds," "patients" and "subscribers," are those who receive care from providers. 8 Sponsors include employers who offer a group health benefit plan to their employees and pay a majority of the plan's expenses. 9 In the case of Medicare and Medicaid, the government plays the role of sponsor. 10 Intermediaries provide an administrative framework, which includes the bill paying process (i.e., payers, insurers, health plans, etc.). 11
A. Managed Care and the Alphabet Soup
Many health plans today fall under the label of ''managed care." 12 Definitions of managed care vary. 13 However, a common definition describes it as a system that attempts to control health care cost, access, and (describes the types of managed care plans in existence today); WILLIAM N. TINDALL ET AL., A GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE MED. S-14 (2000) (describes the types of managed care plans in existence today).
13. KONGSTVEDT, supra note 6, at230.
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quality. 14 Defining the separate classes of managed care. health plans is also a difficult task. 15 Some analysts describe the health care system as an ''unintelligible alphabet soup of three-letter health plans." 16 Examples of the three-letter health plans include health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), preferred provider organizations (''PPOs"), and point-of-service plans ("POSs"). 17 At one time, the individual models included unique features that distinguished them from each other. 18 HMOs, in their purest form, involve prepaid arrangements where the payer offers subscribers health care services in exchange for a monthly fee. 19 HMO models attempt to control health utilization and quality more than other plans.2° HMOs are designed to include a primary care physician .who operates as a gatekeeper by overseeing the patient's care and provirung referrals to specialists. 21 Except under limited circumstances, a subscriber is responsible for the total health care costs when visiting a provider outside of the HM0. 22 The PPO design involves less control of health care cost and quality than HMO plans, but generally gives the patient more freedom in choosing providers. 23 PPOs contain a network of physicians who bill for each service at a discounted rate. 24 A subscriber may have a deductible, which is a fixed out-of-pocket amount the consumer is required to pay before the health plan will cover any fees. 25 After the deductible is met, the subscriber then may pay a coinsurance amount, which is a small percentage of each service he receives. 26 Some providers, specialists in particular, are often outside of PPO networks. 27 If the patient wants to use an out-of-network provider, the health plan will reimburse the subscriber, usually at a rate that is reduced by a difference of twenty percent. 28 percent of the cost of a certain service offered by an in-network provider, the plan would pay sixty percent for that same service when offered by an out-of-network provider. 29 A POS plan is a hybrid of plans similar to HMOs and PPOs? 0 POS plans operate similar to HMOs when the consumer follows HMO procedures?1 When the subscriber wants to use an out-of-network provider, the POS operates more like a PP0. 32 
B. The Development of Managed Care Plans
Researchers assert that managed care originated in 1910, when a group of providers in Washington began offering a broad range of services to Tacoma lumber mill workers for a monthly premium of $0.50 per member.33 This concept evolved during the Great Depression when physician groups and hospitals established health plans to maintain or increase patient revenue.l 4 By World War II, employers began creating HMOs as a benefit for employees and other consumers demanding greater access to less expensive health care. 35
In the 1960s, the cost ofhealth care skyrocketed. 36 In an effort to support the development of more private sector health plans, Congress passed the HMO Assistance Act of 1973. 37 Meanwhile, in the 1970s the health care system saw the creation of PP0s. 38 Despite this growth in managed care, by 1980 approximately ninety percent of employed Americans received health coverage from indemnity insurance. 39 However, in the 1980s traditional indemnity plans began to decline, while the prevalence ofHMOs and other managed care entities grew. 40 
C. Health Insurance Contracts
Regardless of the label used, the health insurance industry utilizes contracts as the basis for the rights and responsibilities that one party owes another. 45 The features of the contract include agreements on the services a plan provides, the process consumers must use to access those services, and the manner of reimbursement. 46 Contracts that include networks generally require the payers to reimburse the in-network providers directly for the services that those providers render to their patients who are consumers under the plan. 47 However, an insurance company has no contractual obligation to directly reimburse out-of-network providers because those providers do not share a contractual relationship with the plan. 48 Even though contracts specifY duties, laws, and regulations, courts also govern the relationships among the parties. 49 A modem view of courts interpreting contracts is that parties generally can assign, or in other words transfer, their contractual rights to a third party.50 Receiving health insurance benefits is a right a policyholder has from a contract with the insurer, assuming that the policyholder does not violate any of the terms. 51 Therefore, under this modem approach to contract law, a covered individual could transfer the right to health insurance benefits to a lished HMOs were joined by a stunning array of new health care financing .and delivery entities.").
41. third party, such as an out-of-network provider. Under this scheme, the insurer would send reimbursement directly to the out-of-network provider.
D. Legal Challenges to Anti-Assignment Provisions
Before the last decade, insurers in Indiana generally allowed policyholders to assign benefits to out-of-network providers. 52 Currently, some health plans have contractual provisions with policyholders that prohibit the covered individual from assigning benefits to out-of-network providers. 53 Courts usually do not allow parties to assign their rights when the contract includes provisions that explicitly prohibit assignment. 54 When consumers have challenged prohibitions on assignment, courts have generally upheld the provision by reasoning that assigning benefits is against public policy. 
E. AOB Laws around the Country

Overview of AOB Laws Around the Country
Because the position of the majority of courts is to enforce antiassignment provisions when they exist in health insurance contracts, some states have enacted laws to force insurers to accept a patient's request for AOB. 57 As of January, 2010, approximately two dozen states had enacted mandatory AOB laws. 5 8 Approximately half of those states have AOB laws that cover many types of providers. 59 The AOB laws of the remaining states only apply to certain categories like dental or emergency care. 60 Further, some people who participate in the AOB debate believe that whether a state has an Any-Willing-Provider ("A WP") law is relevant to the question of whether AOB legislation is appropriate. 61 A WP laws require insurers to accept into their networks any provider that meets the general standards set by the insurer. 62 Nearly half of the states in the nation have A WP laws, most of which are limited to dental and pharmacy services. 63 Fewer than ten states apply their A WP laws to health care providers beyond dental services. 64 Whenever, in any health insurance claim form, an insured specifically authorizes payment of benefits directly to any recognized hospital, licensed ambulance provider, physician, dentist, or other person who provided the services in accordance with the provisions of the policy, the insurer shall make such payment to the designated provider of such services. The insurance contract may not prohibit, and claims forms must provide an option for, the payment of benefits directly to a licensed hospital, licensed ambulance provider, physician, dentist, or other person who provided the services in accordance with the provisions of the policy for care provided. The insurer may require written attestation of assignment of benefits. 66 . MANDATED HEALTH BENEFIT TASKFORCE, supra note 27, at 4. 67. Id. 68. Id.; see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 33-24-54 (requiring insurers that pay benefits directly to network providers to also pay benefits directly to: "any similarly licensed nonparticipating or nonpreferred provider who has rendered such services, has a written assignment of benefits, and has caused written notice of such assignment to be given to the person licensed under this title or jointly to such nonparticipating or nonpreferred provider and to the insured, subscriber, or other covered person; provided, however, that in either case the person licensed under this title shall be required to send such benefit payments directly to the provider who has the written assignment."); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20-16 (2006) (requiring "[ e ]very doctor of medicine, every doctor of dental surgery, every podiatrist, and every health care provider within a class approved by the health care corporation who is appropriately licensed to practice and who is reputable and in g<XJ<l standing shall have the right to become a participating physician or approved health care provider for medical or surgical care, or both, as the case may be, under such terms or conditions as are imposed on other participating physicians or approved health care providers within such approved class under similar circumstances in accordance with this chapter. "). Between 2005 and 2010, Indiana legislators worked to enact broadly applied, mandatory AOB legislation. 73 As ofthe end of the 2010 session, the furthest point an AOB bill reached in the legislative process in Indiana was a vote in the chamber where it originated. 74 In February, 2009, twentyfive members of the Indiana Senate voted in favor of a mandatory AOB bill, twenty-four members voted against it, and one member was excused from the vote. 75 Even though the bill received more votes in its favor, it failed because it lacked a constitutional majority. 76 The bill would have required insurers to send benefit payments directly to all out-of-network providers when the provider and the consumer have an assignment of benefits agreement. 77 Legislators have continued their efforts beyond the 2009 session. 78 In the 2010 session, three senators introduced a bill similar to those introduced in previous years that would require broadly applied, mandatory AOB. 79 However, this Senate bill was never voted on during the short legislative session. 80 In addition to working on AOB legislation during sessions of the Indiana General Assembly, state lawmakers and an independent state government commission have analyzed the issue between sessions. 81 83 The report suggested that a mandatory AOB law in Indiana should only apply to situations where health care consumers "have no choice in the selection of provider.',s 4 As the report elaborated, those situations could include providers who are emergency room physicians, anesthesiologists, radiologists, or pathologists. 85 The task force further recommended that a mandatory AOB law may need to include provisions to protect consumers from receiving a bill for unreimbursed services after their providers receive payment directly from their insurers. 86 
Ill. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF STATES MANDATED AOB
As the Indiana General Assembly and other state legislatures debate the issue of whether to require insurers to honor AOB agreements, many different interest groups have visited statehouses around the country. 87 The primary proponents of broadly applied, mandatory AOB legislation include different groups ofproviders. 88 For example, representatives from the Indiana State Medical Association ("ISMA") and from individual associations of chiropractors, psychologists, and dentists have appeared before state lawmakers in Indiana to present their case as to why the state should have a mandatory AOB law. 89 
A. Mandatory AOB Would Provide Fairness to Providers
Proponents of mandatory AOB legislation argue it would provide fairness to providers by ensuring that they would receive compensation for the services they offer. 90 The Indiana Psychological Association ("IPA'') says denying patients the right to assign benefits to their out-of-network providers "often prevents the Psychologist's [sic] office from ever receiving payment."91 An association of Maryland medical group administrators conducted a survey revealing that eighty-four percent of respondents indicated that patients frequently fail to pay their medical bills after receiving 82. The governor appoints a ten-member task force with representatives from insurance companies, consumers, health care providers, employers, and independent actuaries. reimbursements. 92 The IP A explains that when patients receive reimbursement from their insurer, they often think that they no longer have a debt to their health care provider. 93 Meanwhile, the patients may use the reimbursements to cover other outstanding debts like a child's college tuition, resulting in an inability to pay their medical provider. 94 Some medical group administrators and doctors note that collection problems involving patients who have received reimbursements are becoming an increasingly common occurrence. 95 Also, these situations are not limited to people who use their reimbursement checks for reasons as noble as paying a child's college tuition bill. 96 In a newspaper opinion piece, the chief executive officer of a Florida addiction-treatment program described the story of a man whose health insurance company sent him a reimbursement check. 97 The man, who had received treatment for a drug addiction, did not pay his provider, but rather used the money to buy drugs off the street. 98 The executive also described another man who received reimbursement of more than $1,000 and used it to take a trip, where he committed suicide. 99 Regardless of the reasons why patients fail to pay their providers after receiving a reimbursement check, the result is that at least some providers accumulate a significant amount of charges that must be written off as a loss and re-classified as an expense because it is unable to be collected (i.e., bad debt). 100 The Indiana Dental Association ("IDA") compiled anecdotal data to show how collection issues are affecting providers. 101 ed $8,000 to $13,000 of bad debt in six months, 102 or roughly ten percent of the revenues an average dentist office would receive after overhead expenses are subtracted. 103 One dentist stated that his billing staff spends forty percent of its time trying to locate money from patients who have received reimbursement from their insurers but have yet to pay their debt with their dentist. 104 Providers who experience collection problems may incur bad debt and subsequently raise rates. 105 Proponents further argue that insurers may deny AOB as a way to force providers into a network that has low reimbursement rates. 106 Some providers say allowing health insurance companies to reject AOB presents them with the undesirable choice of either entering a network and accepting lower reimbursement rates or staying outside the network and chasing payments that the insurer sends to their patients. 107 Therefore, some providers suggest that using the direct payment incentive as leverage is an unfair business practice. 108 Some doctors say this is especially unfair in the current health insurance system because providers have a decreasing amount of bargaining power in negotiations with health plans. 109 While insurance companies acknowledge that direct payments are used to attract providers to their networks, they argue that the direct payment incentive is justified because it helps them build or maintain strong networks, which leads to a reduction ofhealth care costs. 110 
B. Mandatory AOB Would Eliminate Many Administrative Problems Associated with Payments and Billing
AOB proponents also assert that the process of insurers reimbursing patients for out-of-network medical services is cumbersome without [Vol. 8:171 AOB. 1 11 The IPA says that barring an individual from assigning benefits to a provider "disrupts payments to the Psychologist's [sic] office [and] creates confusion .... " 112 The IPA explains that the provider's office may not be informed that the patient received compensation, which could cause weeks of delay in the billing process. 113 This confusion, caused by the inability to assign benefits, may be compounded when the patient has coverage by more than one insurer. 114 Finally, the IPA asserts that in some cases involving dual coverage, these administrative complications result in a patient failing to receive all of the benefits to which he or she is entitled. 115 There is also concern that the effects of administrative billing difficulties may discourage patients from visiting out-of-network providers, and thereby decrease patient access. 116 The IDA contends that AOB would eliminate many of the administrative problems associated with payments and billing. 117 Even if a provider eventually receives payment, some note that the provider might experience delays and cash flow disruptions if it cannot receive payments directly from the insurer. 118 Some say that these delays harm patients because they reduce the time that providers can spend focusing on actual health care. 119 
C. Mandatory AOB Would Reduce the Amount of Litigation between Insurers and Providers
It is also argued that mandatory AOB laws would provide efficiency, consistency, and predictability. 120 garding payments between insurers and out-of-network providers, the end result is litigation. 121 This creates significant transactional costs. 122 The ISMA fears that those transactional costs may negatively affect the cost of health care in general. 123 The ISMA states that health care providers do not want to play the role of creditor, but they are often forced to do so. 124 Proponents think that allowing AOB would help remove the need for providers to go to court after patients fail to pay, because when the patient assigns the benefits, the insurer's reimbursement goes directly to the provider. 125 Furthermore, when an insured is unable to assign benefits to an out-ofnetwork provider, the provider generally cannot challenge the insurer's reimbursement126 The American Medical Association says that providers are more willing and capable of investigating and appealing the reimbursements when a dispute exists concerning the amount the health plan should cover. 127 Therefore, the organization says that it is unfair to give patients the responsibility of legally challenging a reimbursement. 128
D. Mandatory AOB Would Reduce the Amount of Out-of-Network Providers Who Require Full Payment Up Front
Proponents argue that AOB would reduce the number of out-ofnetwork providers who require full payment before services are rendered because they know they will receive some reimbursement from an insurer.129 For example, many Indiana psychologists have begun to ask for upfront payments because of the difficulty of collecting payments after they provide services. 130 Many dentists who do not participate in a network are also forced to choose whether to require up-front payments or risk that the See Dolinski, supra note 5; AM. MEn. Ass'N, supra note 109 ("If an assignment is given by the patient and ignored by the insurer, the patient is forced to 'front' the cost of the service, until the insurer either sends payment to the patient or the provider reimburses the patient. This is an unreasonable burden to place on the consumer.").
130. IND. HEALTH FIN. CoMM'N, supra note 81, at 3; see also IND. PsYCHOL. Ass'N, supra note 91 (''[AOB] often allows patients to leave the office without making full payment for services, knowing that the psychologists will bill them for any balance not paid by the insurance company.").
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IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATES MANDATING AOB
A. Mandatory AOB Would Weaken Insurers' Health Care Networks
As proponents of mandatory AOB present their arguments to state lawmakers, health insurance companies, employers, and labor unions join forces to argue their opposing positions. 133 A chief argument against enacting broadly applied, mandatory AOB is that it would weaken insurers' health care networks. 134 Insurance companies contend that a doctor's ability to receive reimbursements directly from an insurer is an important incentive for the physician to join the insurer's network. 135 The argument is that if any provider can receive direct payments from any insurer, then there is less of an incentive to stay in a certain network. 136 During AOB legislative debates in Maryland, an insurer presented evidence regarding the effect AOB had on other health plans. 137 The Maryland-based insurer, CareFirst BCBS, reported that when Idaho enacted mandatory AOB in 1992, half of the dentists in one network dropped out of it within a matter of weeks. 138 CareFirst also noted that a survey of Hawaiian providers indicated that slightly more than half would leave a network if insurers were required to honor AOB. 139 CareFirst also presented data that The BCBS Association commissioned a study in 2003 that showed discounts and protections that patients receive from using networks for their care amount to thousands of dollars for people with major medical conditions.148 The study looked at five patient ''profiles," 149 and found estimated annual cost savings of $3,234 to $13,482 for in-network physician services and $6,751 to $30,404 for in-network hospital services. 150 The study con- [Vol. 8:171 eluded that savings like these might be reduced if networks were weakened as a result of mandatory AOB. 151 Some argue that even if doctors do not leave their networks, AOB to out-of-network providers may give network doctors more leverage in their negotiations with insurers to argue for higher reimbursements. 152 This leverage could interfere with the insurer's ability to negotiate with network providers for a lower reimbursement rate and thus could translate to higher medical costs for consumers. 153 According to the insurer, CareFirst, AOB legislation in Idaho in 1992 resulted in a twenty-nine percent increase in out-of-pocket health care costs. 154 CareFirst estimates that for every ten-percent loss in provider participation in its network, the health care costs for consumers would increase by eight percent. 155 The health insurance industry further argues that the deterioration of their PPO networks would increase the number of uninsured citizens. 156 Some employers and labor unions fear that weakened networks would translate to higher premiums. 157 Employers are worried that by weakening health care networks, mandatory AOB would interfere with an insurer and an employer negotiating a contract. 158 Legislative staff in Virginia who analyzed the issue came to the conclusion that weakened health care networks would lead to higher premiums for both employers and their employees. 159 When Florida considered passing a mandatory AOB bill in 2009, BCBS of Florida asserted that a mandatory AOB would impose a significant cost to Florida's State Employees' Health Insurance Trust Fund because of the effect of a weakened network. 160 A BCBS of Florida analysis showed that it would cost the trust fund between $9.9 million and $25.7 million in one fiscal year. 161 In addition to managing the cost of health care, insurers attempt to control the quality of care. 164 Some believe that conferring the right to collect directly from insurers would blur the distinction between network providers and out-of-network providers, which could be harmful to the system. 165 For good or bad, networks play a central role in the benefit design of our health care system. 166 The ability to collect reimbursements directly from insurers is often only available to providers who are in the health plan's network. 167 However, the method of receiving reimbursements for services is not the only distinction between network providers and out-of-network providers. Among the many important differences are quality assurance and credentialing. 168 Therefore, some argue that blurring the distinction between network providers and out-of-network providers would harm the insurance companies' ability to create what they think is the most "intelligent, legally acceptable, and commercially attractive" benefit design. The parties who participate in the AOB debate have in large part tried to present their arguments within the frame ofwhat is best for consumers. 173 However, both insurance companies and doctors have interests in making profits. One possible solution falls somewhere between the positions of providers, insurers, and sponsors. Indiana legislators should require that health plans honor AOB, as well as create a conditional sunset provision for the AOB legislation. The legislature should also consider imposing requirements on the amount of reimbursement paid to out-of-network providers, prohibiting balance billing for emergency care services, and repealing the state's A WP law.
How the RefUsal of Insurers to Honor AOB Harms the Health Care System
Considering that anecdotal data dominates the AOB debate, legislators likely have a difficult time weighing the potential outcomes of their decision regarding the AOB issue. 174 At least in Indiana, opponents of mandatory AOB note that proponents do not use empirical data to support their arguments. 175 For example, the testimonies of Indiana providers detail the experience of only some medical offices. 176 Nonetheless, these testimonies show that the inability of at least some out-of-network doctors to receive direct reimbursements poses significant financial burdens on their practices. 177 Assuming that these providers will shift at least some of the financial burden to patients, it follows that the insurers' refusal to honor AOB raises the cost of care that these out-of-network doctors provide. 178 The evidence also shows that some consumers covered by a network plan choose to receive services from out-of-network providers at least some of the time. 179 When the insureds are unable to assign their health insurance benefits to their out-of-network providers, they often experience a cumbersome process of waiting to receive payments from the health plan and paying their doctor's bills. 180 refusal to honor assignment requests increases the transactional costs of health care delivery, as doctors spend more time trying to collect payment from patients and patients have more disputes with their health plans regarding reimbursements. 181 Furthermore, the refusal to honor AOB requires some providers to demand up-front payments from consumers because of the uncertainties of being able to collect from them. 182 These additional consequences that result from an insurer's refusal to honor AOB further raise or at least threaten to raise the cost of receiving services from out-ofnetwork providers. These consequences also likely affect, to some degree, access to care from out-of-network providers. 183 
The Evidence Fails to Show That Mandatory AOB Weaken Networks
While the evidence shows that allowing insurers to prohibit AOB increases the cost of health care that some out-of-network doctors provide, the health insurance industry argues that a mandatory AOB law would create a net increase in health care costs. 184 However, information presented by health insurance companies does not prove such a position. 185 In AOB discussions, insurers primarily argue that AOB laws threaten the strength of their networks. 186 For example, when the Maryland General Assembly considered an AOB bill in 2009, an insurer, CareFirst, presented data in an effort to show the effect of AOB laws on the strength of health plan networks. 187 As discussed more fully in Section N, CareFirst's information included anecdotal data about Idaho dentists from 1992, a survey of Hawaii providers, the effect of a Virginia insurer's anti-assignment policy on its own network, and general statements about the strength of the networks of insurers from Nevada and Colorado. 188 While this evidence supports the argument that AOB laws may weaken health plan networks, it provides an insufficient basis to conclude that this result would happen in Indiana if the legislature enacted mandatory AOB. 187. Letter from Casey, supra note 135, at 3-4. But cf. Letter from Tolliver, supra note 92 (stating that a survey of Maryland providers shows that ninety-percent would remain innetwork even iflegislature would enact AOB law).
188. Letter from Casey, supra note 135, at 3-4; see also supra Part IV.A.
In 2005, a consulting group that studied the AOB issue for a Virginia group of doctors concluded that AOB laws had not interfered with insurers' ability to provide "adequate cost-effective networks." 189 The consultants observed that three of the four main health insurance companies in the United States-United Healthcare, Aetna, and Cigna-honor AOB but have not incurred any negative financial consequences for doing so. 190 According to some reports, the insurance company, Humana, also honors AOB while containing costs with a "strong" network. 191 The evidence that several insurers voluntarily allow AOB and maintain strong networks indicates AOB laws would likely have minimal effect on the strength of health plan networks. Other incentives, such as higher patient volume, will likely keep a large number of doctors in network, even if they can receive direct payments out ofnetwork. 192 Even if the networks of insurers would weaken in the coming years, the decline of strong networks would not necessarily be a result of mandatory AOB. "An increasing number of physicians do not contract with managed care companies." 193 Some providers believe a major reason for doctors leaving networks is because insurers' reimbursement rates are too low regardless of whether there is AOB. 194 
The Evidence Fails to Show That Mandatory AOB Increases Health Care Costs Generally
Even assuming that AOB laws weaken networks, health insurance companies have failed to prove the resulting weak networks would cause a net harm by increasing costs or limiting access to health care. As discussed previously, health insurance representatives commonly testify to the amount of health care savings members receive for participating in a. plan that uses a network. 195 For example, representatives often cite a 2003 study that a consulting group completed for the BCBS Association. 196 This study tracked the savings that some types of patients realized when they used innetwork doctors. 197 In at least one AOB debate, an insurer asserted that outof-pocket costs of consumers covered by a network increased by an esti-mated twenty-nine percent in Idaho in 1992 because of AOB legislation. 198 Despite empirical evidence showing savings consumers realize for using network doctors, and anecdotal data like the experience of Idaho patients, no one has established a correlation between AOB and an overall increase of health care costs. 199 Even assuming that mandatory AOB laws increase health care costs for some consumers, health insurance companies have failed to show this would cause a net increase in total costs. Furthermore, the evidence does not show that the increase in costs insurers fear would outweigh the financial burdens that out-of-network providers incur because of their inability to receive direct reimbursements.
The extent of the harm that out-of-network providers in Indiana experience because insurers refuse to honor AOB is unknown. Nonetheless, evidence shows that allowing payers to reimburse consumers directly increases the cost of out-of-network services, assuming that out-of-network doctors share some of their financial burdens with their patients. Meanwhile, AOB opponents base their arguments on speculation, which does not show that mandatory AOB would create a net harrn to health care costs. Therefore, Indiana should enact a broadly based, mandatory AOB law.
B. Structure of the Legislation
Indiana Legislators Should Consider a Conditional Sunset Provision
When Florida implemented a broadly applied, mandatory AOB, it included a conditional sunset provision.Z 00 The amendment to Florida's AOB law are automatically repealed three years after its effective date if the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability finds that "the amendments made by this act have caused the third-party administrator of the state group health plan to suffer a net loss of physicians from its preferred provider plan network and, as a direct result, caused an increase in costs to the state group health plan.'' 201 Indiana has entertained a similar
